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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY
Mixon v. Fitzgerald
One of the most highly valued principles of democratic government
is that no man is above the law.' As Justice Marshall proclaimed in
Marbuy v. Madison,2 "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury."' 3 Through the defense of immunity,
however, the courts have carved an exception to this basic principle. In
Nion v. Fitzgerald,4 the Supreme Court applied the exception to hold
that a President may not be held civilly liable for any actions taken
within the scope of his office. This Note argues that this grant of abso-
lute immunity was overly broad, and that the Court should have
granted the President qualified immunity, reserving absolute immunity
only for certain highly sensitive functions.5
1 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882):
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the govern-
ment, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound
to obey it.
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 Id. at 163; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 429 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Accountability of each individual for individual conduct lies at
the core of all law-indeed, of all organized societies."); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390-98 (1971) (creating an implied right to sue federal officials for civil
damages arising from constitutional violations).
4 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
5 This Note will deal exclusively with presidential immunity from constitutional viola-
tions for three reasons. First, of all possible infractions, constitutional violations are the most
significant. Second, many of the Supreme Court cases consider immunity under the rubric of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980), which deals entirely with constitutional violations. Third,
the Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), distinguished common law torts from
constitutional claims and held that violation of the former by a cabinet member does not
abrogate absolute immunity. See infra note 44. The Court, in offering this distinction, did not
clearly specify into which category statutory violations would fall. Justice White, in distin-
guishing the cases of common law torts, wrote for the majority in Butz V. Economou that "[i]t is
apparent also that a quite different question would have been presented had the officer ig-
nored an express statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority." 438 U.S. at 489.
Although the language of the majority in Butz seems to indicate that statutory violations and
constitutional infractions would obviate absolute immunity, the ambiguity still exists.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
I
THE CONCEPT OF IMMUNITY
A. Absolute Immunity
Officials entitled to absolute immunity 6 need not defend on the
merits of a complaint; the court will dismiss the case early in the pro-
ceedings.7 To be eligible for absolute immunity, the defendant must
demonstrate that his contested behavior fell within the scope of his offi-
cial duties.8 The applicable test, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Spalding v. Vi/as,9 is very broad: any "action having more or less connec-
tion"10 with the executive's office is within the scope of his authority.
Only activities that are "manifestly or palpably beyond" his duties fall
outside the standard. I ' In the words of Justice Rehnquist, the test en-
sures protection for the officer who has not "wandered completely off
the official reservation."'12
A second frequently cited criterion for absolute immunity requires
that the defendant's challenged activity be "discretionary" as opposed
to "ministerial."' 3 The conduct must not be perfunctory or involve in-
significant decisions based on office routine rather than personal judg-
6 For a comprehensive history of the immunity defense, see Cass, Damage Suits Against
Public Ofjiers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1119-1133 (1981); Note, Qualiftd Immunity for Executive
Oft9ialsfor Constitutional Violations: Butz v. Economou, 20 B.C.L. REv. 575 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Qualified Immunity]. For a discussion of presidential immunity, see Note, Presidential
Immunityfrom Constitutional Damage Liability, 60 B.U.L. REv. 879 (1980) (advocating absolute
immunity for the President) [hereinafter cited as PresidentialInmunity]; The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Immunity of the President and Other Govenment Offiials, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 226-36 (1982)
(discussion of Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow v. Fitzgerald) [hereinafter cited as Immunity]; Note,
Halperin v. Kissinger. The D.C Circuit Rejects Presidential Immunityraom Damage Actions, 26 LoY.
L. REv. 144 (1980) (rejecting absolute immunity for the President).
7 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) ("An absolute immunity
defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immu-
nity."); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971) ("An immunity
. . . does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability.").
8 See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1959) (official acted within "line of
duty" in making statements about plaintiffs in press release); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,
498 (1896) (head of executive department "cannot be held liable to a civil suit for damages on
account of official communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in
respect of matters within his authority'); cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526
(1972) (congressman accused of accepting bribe does not receive immunity, because alleged
activity is not within scope of legislator's office).
9 161 U.S. 483 (1896); see supra note 8.
10 161 U.S. at 498.
11 Id.
12 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 519 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 488-99
(1896). The Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974), articulated the
policy reason for affording more latitude to high-level officials: "In short, since the options
which a chief executive and his principal subordinates must consider are far broader and far
more subtle than those made by officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion must
be comparably broad."
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ment. 14 This distinction is not especially important in the case of the
President, however, because by the nature of his office, few decisions are
ministerial.
Courts and commentators have justified the use of absolute immu-
nity on two grounds. First, they argue that it would be too harsh if a
well-intentioned official who must make difficult "discretionary" deci-
sions were subject to costly and annoying suits merely for performing his
job.15 A second and more compelling argument raises the fear that the
threat of civil liability would deter officials from making controversial
decisions. 16 In confronting the delicate balance between the rights of
aggrieved plaintiffs and the need of officials to make unfettered deci-
sions, the courts historically have favored absolute immunity.17 As
Judge Learned Hand explained: "[I]t has been thought in the end bet-
ter to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation."18
Applying this reasoning, courts have granted judges, 19 prosecu-
14 For an explanation of the "discretionary" requirement, see Hyman, QualiftedImmunity
Reconsidered, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1409 (1981); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Oftiers: Dam-
age Actions, 77 HARv. L. REV. 209, 223 (1963); Note, Constitutional Law-Federal Executive Off-
cials Suedfor Alleged Violations of Constitutional Rights Entitled Only to a Q=ualjied Immunity, 53 TUL.
L. REV. 955 (1978).
15 See Jaffe, supra note 14, at 223. This rationale, however, does not carry much weight
because "it has become obvious that any injustice to the officer can easily be taken care of by
indemnity or assumption of direct liability by the state." See id.
16 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutor
assures vigorous and fearless performance). Imbler quoted Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d
277, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935):
The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness
and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should charac-
terize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus
be impeded and we would have moved away from the desired objective of
stricter and fairer law enforcement.
424 U.S. at 424.
17 The Court, in granting absolute immunity to a governmental official in Barr v. Mat-
teo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), explained the dilemma:
[We are called upon in this case to weigh in a particular context two
considerations of high importance which now and again come into sharp con-
flict-on the one hand, the protection of the individual citizen against pecuni-
ary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part ofofficials of
the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection of the public inter-
est by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and
inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on ac-
count of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities.
Id. at 564-65; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950) (absolute immunity for government officers because burden of trial and danger of
its outcome would dampen ardor of most officials in performing their duties).
18 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
19 .g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871).
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tors,20 and legislators2 1 absolute immunity from civil liability for all ac-
tivities within the scope of their official functions. The question of
federal executive immunity, however, is considerably more complicated
because of the Court's apparent retreat from its earlier holdings2 2 that
federal executive officials are absolutely immune from civil liability.23
In the early case of Spalding v. filas,24 the Supreme Court applied the
''same general considerations of public policy and convenience" that
mandated immunity for judges to "heads of Executive Departments." 25
Thus, even though the plaintiff alleged malice, the Court held the Post-
master General absoiutely immune from a charge of libel.26 Justice
Harlan expressed the Court's concern that subjecting an executive offi-
cial to civil suit "would seriously cripple the proper and effective admin-
istration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the
government .... -27 Similarly, in Barr v. Matteo28 the Supreme Court
applied the Spalding doctrine to afford a sub-cabinet-level official abso-
lute immunity from charges of libel and defamation stemming from a
press release in which he announced his intention to suspend employees
mistakenly accused of committing actions condemned by Congress. 29 In
more recent cases, however, the Court has indicated a willingness to
limit executive officials' immunity from civil liability for certain
actions.30
20 E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir.
1926), afd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
21 The speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution grants congressmen
and their aides immunity for acts related to their legislative function. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6;
see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 613-22 (1972) (United States Senator immune from
criminal prosecution for reading the "Pentagon Papers" into the Congressional Record dur-
ing special session of Senate subcommittee).
In Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court granted absolute immunity to
state legislators as well. Tenny also presented the Court with its first opportunity to consider
the question of official immunity to suits brought under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
IV 1980). See in/a note 32.
22 See in/a notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
23 The Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), distinguished the early cases
that granted federal executive officials absolute immunity from later cases that conferred only
qualified immunity on the ground that the former involved common law tort claims while the
latter dealt with constitutional allegations. See id. at 492-96. This argument is particularly
unconvincing because implied-damage actions grounded in constitutional rights only became
available after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See in/a notes 39,
44.
24 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
25 Id. at 498.
26 See id. at 499.
27 See id. at 498.
28 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
29 See id. at 570-74.
30 See in/ia notes 31-50.
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B. Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court first applied the qualified immunity test in
1973 in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 3' The case involved a section 198332 suit
against Governor Rhodes of Ohio for his alleged responsibility in the
killing of four students by national guardsmen during an anti-war dem-
onstration at Kent State University.33 Rejecting the governor's defense
of absolute immunity in section 1983 actions, 34 the Court held that an
officer is immune from civil suit if at the time of action he possessed a
good-faith belief that his actions were lawful.3 5
The Scheuer test frustrated both the defendants, whose motives and
thought processes were opened to discovery, and the plaintiffs, who con-
fronted the difficult task of demonstrating bad faith. 36 The Court modi-
fied the qualified-immunity test a year later in another section 1983
case, Wood v. Strickland,37 by adding an objective element. The Court
held that not only would it deny immunity if the official knew he was
violating the plaintiffs constitutional rights, but it also would deny im-
munity if the official reasonably should have known that his act consti-
tuted such a violation.38 The objective part of the test enabled plaintiffs
to sue negligent as well as malicious officials.
Butz v. Economou39 involved a federal executive faced with a consti-
tutional tort claim. Although it was not a section 1983 case,40 it
31 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) reads in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
33 See 416 U.S. at 234.
34 Se id. at 243. For a discussion of immunity from § 1983 suits, see Eisenberg, Section
1983. Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Stud, 67 CORNELL L. Rgv. 482 (1982).
35 [a] qualifed immunity [of varying scope] is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of dis-
cretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they rea-
sonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based.
416 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
36 See infia notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
37 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (suspended students charged school board members, under
§ 1983, with violating their fifth amendment and due process rights).
38 See id. at 321. The Court noted that an official "must be held to a standard of con-
duct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unques-
tioned constitutional rights of his charges." Id. at 322.
39 438 U.S 478 (1978).
40 Butz was a "Bivens-type" action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, acting under their authority as federal
narcotics agents, violated his fourth amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of
his apartment. The Court held that Bivens was entitled to damages. See id. at 395-97. A
similar right under § 1983 had existed for some time to redress damages arising from constitu-
[Vol. 68:236
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presented the Court with an opportunity to reexamine the absolute im-
munity granted high-ranking officers in Spalding v. Vila4a and Barr v.
Matteo ,42 in light of the later section 1983 decisions. In Butz, Economou
sued the Secretary of Agriculture for constitutional and statutory viola-
tions. The five-to-four majority opinion, written by Justice White, held
that although Butz was absolutely immune from all suits alleging com-
mon law tort claims, he was only entitled to qualified immunity for the
constitutional charges.43 Justice White cited the reasoning of the section
1983 cases and proclaimed that "[t]o create a system in which the Bill of
Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does
that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its
head."44 The majority provided, however, that certain "special func-
tions" of an executive officer, such as his adjudicatory or prosecutorial
roles, could be afforded absolute immunity from civil liability.45
The Court once again modified the qualified immunity standard in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.46 In Harlow, the Court held that Bryce Harlow and
tional violations committed under the color of state law. See supra note 32. The Court's deci-
sion in Bivens to allow damages for constitutional violations by federal officers thereby
removed an illogical discrepancy. See infra note 44.
41 161 U.S. 483 (1896); see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
42 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
43 See 360 U.S. at 507.
44 438 U.S. at 504. Justice White also noted that strong reasons support equalizing the
§ 1983 and Bivens remedies. Both types of action originate from the Constitution and, from
both practical and policy standpoints, 'federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protec-
tion when they violatefederal constitutional rules than dostate officers." Id. at 501 (emphasis
in original).
Justice Rehnquist vigorously dissented, condemning what he considered to be the arbi-
trary distinction drawn by the majority between common law torts and constitutional viola-
tions. He faulted the majority for indulging a strained reading of prior cases and for
insensitivity to the plight of the vulnerable official. In particular, he outlined two differences
that he perceived between § 1983 and Bivens actions. First, Bivens actions are generally not
directed against high-ranking executive officials, for whom absolute immunity is desirable,
but rather against officials who historically have received only qualified immunity. There-
fore, absolute immunity for executive officials would not eviscerate a Bivens action. See id. at
524. Second, Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity for Bivens actions, but did not do
so for § 1983 suits. This waiver permits suits against the federal government rather than
against the offending official. In addition, "the Federal Government can internally supervise
and check its own officers. The Federal Government is not so situated that it can control state
officials or strike this same balance, however. Hence the necessity of§ 1983 and the differing
standards of immunity." Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment, of course, is less compelling when no congressional waiver of sovereign immunity exists.
45 See id. at 508-09.
Although a qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general
rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations, our decisions
recognize that there are some officials whose special functions require a full
exemption from liability. In each case, we have undertaken "a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at com-
mon law and the interests behind it."
Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
46 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). See inra note 52.
In Harlow, the companion case to Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that "[t]he considera-
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Alexander Butterfield, two of President Nixon's top aides, were entitled
only to qualified immunity from Fitzgerald's allegations of constitu-
tional violations.47 Concluding, however, that "[j]udicial inquiry into
subjective motivation . . . [was] peculiarly disruptive of effective gov-
ernment," 48 the Court eliminated the subjective element from the quali-
fied-immunity test.49 Without the difficult factual issues involved in
determining malice, this reformed test provided an easier standard for
dismissing insubstantial claims through summary judgment.50
II
NIXoN v FITZGERALD
Fitzgerald sued President Nixon and two of his top aides, Bryce
Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, for civil damages in federal court.5 '
Fitzgerald claimed that he was discharged from the Department of the
Air Force in retaliation for "whistle-blowing" testimony before a con-
gressional committee 52 and that his firing constituted a conspiracy to
tions that supported our decision in Buaz [granting qualified immunity to a cabinet member]
apply with equal force to this case. It is no disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to
hold that Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally are entitled only to a
qualified immunity." 102 S. Ct. at 2734. Chief'Justice Burger, the sole dissenter, argued that
the Court should have granted the aides absolute immunity on the theory of derivative im-
munity. In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 613-22 (1972), the Court had held that
congressional aides were entitled to the same immunity as legislators whenever the aides were
performing legislative functions acting, in effect, as the congressman's "alter ego." Similarly,
Chief Justice Burger contended, "[t]he function of senior Presidential aides, as the 'alter egos'
of the President, is an integral, inseparable part of the function of the President." 102 S. Ct.
at 2744 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
47 See 102 S. Ct. at 2734.
48 Id. at 2738.
49 See id. at 2737-38.
50 See id. at 2739.
51 Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, No. 74-178 (D.D.C. filed March 26, 1980). The suit origi-
nally did not include former President Nixon. Nixon was added as a defendant in an
amended complaint. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2707 (1982).
52 Fitzgerald was employed as a management analyst by the Department of the Air
Force. In 1968, after Nixon was elected President, but before he took office, Fitzgerald testi-
fied before Senator Proxmire's joint congressional subcommittee about a potential $2 billion
cost overrun in the development of the C-5A transport plane. After his testimony, Fitzger-
ald's relationship with his superiors and coworkers in the Department of the Air Force deteri-
orated. In November of 1969 Fitzgerald's job was eliminated in a "reorganization" that he
alleged was merely a camouflage for his retaliatory discharge.
Fitzgerald initiated an administrative proceeding before the Civil Service Commission.
At the hearing, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans denied that Fitzgerald was fired in retalia-
tion for his congressional testimony and "declined to be more specific" as to any White House
involvement. Shortly thereafter, President Nixon announced that he had personally ordered
the termination:
I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked
to resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of some person
down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was submitted to
me. I made it and I stick by it.
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violate his statutory53 and first amendment 54 rights. In a five-to-four
decision, the Court held that Nixon was absolutely immune from civil
liability for all actions taken within the scope of his office. 55 Justice
Powell, writing for the plurality,56 supported the grant of absolute im-
munity through an analysis of history, the constitutional doctrine of sep-
aration of powers, and public policy.5 7 The separation-of-powers
argument also formed the core of Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion.58
The historical analysis appeared in a lengthy footnote,5 9 in which
the plurality argued that the framers of the Constitution never envi-
sioned liability for civil damages resulting from actions taken by a Presi-
dent within the scope of his office. Justice Powell contended that the
The next day, the President retracted his statement, alleging that he had confused Fitzgerald
with someone else. 102 S. Ct. at 2695.
The Commission rejected Fitzgerald's claim of retaliatory termination, but did find that
his discharge was motivated by "reasons purely personal to [Fitzgerald]." Fitzgerald then
filed suit in federal court against Defense Department Officials, White House aides, and later
the President himself. The court of appeals held that because Fitzgerald had no way of know-
ing of the White House's possible involvement until 1973, the statute of limitations had not
run. Id. at 2696. In addition, the district court denied Nixon's motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling that he was not entitled to absolute immunity. Nixon took a collateral appeal of
the immunity decision to the court of appeals, which dismissed summarily. Id. at 2697. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 452 U.S. 959 (1981).
53 The district court held that Fitzgerald had stated implied causes of action under 5
U.S.C. § 7211 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (employees' right to petition Congress) and 18 U.S.C.
§1505 (1976) (obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies and congressional
committees). Brief for Petitioner at IA-2A, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
54 The district court held Fitzgerald had stated a Bivens implied cause of action under
the first amendment by alleging that Nixon retaliated against him for exercising his right of
free speech and petition. Fitzgerald v. Butterild, No. 74-178 at I (D.D.C March 26, 1980).
55 See 102 S. Ct. at 2705.
56 Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's opinion. Classifi-
cation of the opinion is problematic. Because Chief Justice Burger did not formally join it,
Justice Powell's opinion is technically a plurality opinion. It is important to note, however,
that Chief Justice Burger concurred fully in Justice Powell's grant of absolute immunity to
former President Nixon. Chief Justice Burger believed, however, that this result could have
been achieved on constitutional grounds alone. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. In
his dissent, however, Justice White refers to Justice Powell's opinion and Chief Justice Bur-
ger's concurrence as "the Court." Id. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting). One.commentator took
a conservative tack, referring to "the Powell opinion." See Immunity, supra note 6. Because the
policy argument forms the core of Justice Powell's analysis, and hence distinguishes his opin-
ion from the Chief Justice's concurrence, this Note refers to Justice Powell's opinion as a
plurality opinion.
57 See 102 S. Ct. at 2701. Although Justice Powell indicated that he grounded his opin-
ion on three separate foundations, see id, the various arguments that he employed are not
easily distinguished. In particular, his "uniqueness" argument represents a meld of both his
policy and constitutional claims. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. The plurality
used the unique constitutional position of the President to argue that subjecting him to civil
suit was undesirable from a policy standpoint. The separation-of-powers claim is Justice
Powell's only pure constitutional argument.
58 See 102 S. Ct. at 2706 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
59 See id. at 2702 n.31.
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existence of impeachment as a remedy, and the absence of such suits in
the past, testified to an implicit historical understanding that the Presi-
dent was absolutely immune.60 In addition the plurality, and to a
greater extent the dissent, invoked various authorities such as discussions
at constitutional conventions, Senate debates, and the Federalist Papers
to support their historical arguments.6'
The plurality grounded its second justification for granting the
President absolute immunity in the separation-of-powers doctrine.6 2
Chief Justice Burger, who rested his justification of absolute immunity
solely on the separation-of-powers argument, 63 warned in his concur-
rence that "the judiciary always must be hesitant to probe into the ele-
ments of presidential decision-making. . . . Such judicial intervention
is not to be tolerated absent imperative constitutional necessity."64 Jus-
tice Powell conceded in a footnote, however, that the plurality's holding
did not necessarily bar Congress from legislating presidential liability.
Nonetheless, because Congress had expressed no such intent, the plural-
ity refused to intrude upon the presidential office. 65
Justice Powell also revived the policy argument contained in some
of the older absolute-immunity cases66 pondering the dangers posed by
"diversion of [the President's] energies by concern with private law suits
... *67 The plurality noted that unlike the executive officials who re-
ceived only qualified immunity in Scheuer6 and Butz,69 "[t]he President
60 The plurality acknowledged, however, that the historical analysis was limited to "our
constitutional heritage and structure" and could not include a review of the common law
because "the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law." Id.
at 2701. In fact, as the plurality noted, "a right to sue federal officials . . . was not even
recognized until Biuens." Id. at 2703 n.33 (citations omitted).
61 See id. at 2702 n.31.
62 See id. at 2701.
63 In his concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Burger found the plurality's policy arguments
unnecessary and claimed that the separation-of-powers argument alone justified the Court's
decision. See id. at 2706 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64 Id. at 2708 (citation omitted) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Both Chief Justice Burger
and the plurality distinguished between subjecting a President to criminal charges and hold-
ing a President liable for civil damages. The plurality noted that "[t]he Court has recognized
before that there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than. . . in criminal
prosecutions." Id. at 2704 n. 37.
65 See id. at 2701 n.27. Justice Powell contended:
In the present case we. . . are presented only with "implied" causes of action,
and we need not address directly the immunity question as it would arise if
Congress expressly had created a damages action against the President of the
United States. This approach accords with this Court's settled policy of
avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional issues.
Id.
66 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
67 102 S. Ct. at 2703.
68 416 U.S. 232 (1974); see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
69 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme." 70 The fear
that civil suits would deter an official was more "compellig5)71 in the
context of the Presidency, "where the officeholder must make the most
sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our
constitutional system."' 72 Thus, denying the President absolute immu-
nity would pose "unique risks to the effective functioning of govern-
ment. '73 In addition, the plurality considered the "sheer prominence"
of the President's office.74 Not only must the President decide questions
likely to "arouse the most intense feelings," 75 but, in addition, he "would
be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages." 76
In reaching its decision to grant absolute immunity, the plurality
rejected the functional analysis followed in Butz, averring that tradition-
ally, the Court has "refused to draw functional lines finer than history
and reason would support. '77 justice Powell argued that applying a
functional analysis would be unwieldy if not impossible because the
President has discretionary responsibilities in so many areas: "In many
cases it would be difficult to determine which of the President's innu-
merable 'functions' encompassed a particular action. '78 The plurality
also contended that the potential inquiries into the President's motives
and thought processes would be "highly intrusive. '79 The plurality con-
cluded its opinion with a reassurance that "absolute immunity for the
President will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against
misconduct . ... -80 Other checks on presidential behavior remained,
including impeachment, scrutiny by the press, a President's concern for
his "historical stature" and his desire for re-election. 81
Justice White, in a vehement dissent, contended that although the
President deserved some degree of immunity, the demands of his office
did not justify the grant of absolute immunity and the total abandon-
ment of the functional approach.82 He claimed that "immunity at-
70 102 S. Ct. at 2702.
71 Id. at 2703.
72 Id. (footnote omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). In this respect, the plurality
stated that the President is similar to judges and prosecutors to whom absolute immunity is
granted. 102 S. Ct. at 2703.
76 102 S. Ct. at 2703 (citation omitted).
77 Id. at 2705 (citations omitted). Justice Powell did not elaborate upon tlis pronounce-
ment. He merely stated that due to "the special nature of the President's constitutional office
and functions," absolute immunity for the President for acts "within the 'outer perimeter' of
his official responsibility" was appropriate. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2705-06; see Note, Presidential Immunity, supra note 6, at 908-09.
81 102 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
82 Id. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
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taches to particular functions-not to particular offices."'8 3 Justice
White argued that the rejection of functional immunity and adoption of
a blind, absolute standard "clothes the office of the President with sover-
eign immunity, placing it beyond the law."'8 4 Moreover, the grant of
absolute immunity denied an individual the "availability of the courts
to vindicate constitutional and statutory wrongs. . . [an avenue that is]
one of the virtues of our system of delegated and limited powers."18 5
Justice White also attacked the plurality's reasoning rejecting their
historical analysis as misleading and insubstantial. 86 He argued that the
absence of any executive analogue to the speech or debate clause testi-
fied to the founding fathers' unwillingness to allow presidential immu-
nity.8 7 He also rejected Justice Powell's separation-of-powers argument,
contending that it proved too much: if the judicial process was too in-
trusive to allow civil damage remedies, then the President should not be
subjected to any interference by the judiciary.88 Finally, Justice White
argued that the plurality's concession that its opinion did not preclude
Congress from enacting legislation to abolish the President's absolute
immunity undermined the force of the separation-of-powers
argument.89
III
ANALYSIS 9 o
A. The Unique Role of the President
Before Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court appeared to be less willing to
83 Id. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
85 Id. at 2726 (White, J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 2712 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority opinion initially
claims that its conclusion is based substantially on 'our history,' historical analysis in fact
plays virtually no part in the analysis that follows.").
87 See id. at 2712-17 (White, J., dissenting). Neither the majority nor the dissent pro-
vided particularly compelling evidence for their historical assertions. The plurality relied
heavily on Justice Story's view that the President must have absolute immunity to exercise
properly his powers. See id. at 2701-02. The dissent argued that Story's views, coming thirty
years after the constitutional convention, could not have much historical weight. See id. at
2715-16.
88 Ste id. at 2717-18 (White, J., dissenting) ("If there is a separation of powers problem
here, it must be found in the nature of the remedy and not in theprocess involved.") (emphasis
in original).
89 See id. at 2719 n.27, 2723-24 (White, J., dissenting); see also infia note 110 and accom-
panying text.
90 It is important at the outset of this analysis to distinguish the merits of absolute
presidential immunity in general from application of immunity to a particular President.
Although the facts of the claim in Nixon v. Fitzgerald may serve as an example of the equities
and various competing interests involved, the question is larger than the activities of a single
President. As Justice Jackson once remarked:
The opinions ofjudges, no less than executives and publicists, often suffer the
infirmity of confusing the issue of a power's validity with the cause it is
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grant officials absolute immunity, than it had in Spalding v. Vilas9' and
Barr v. Matteo.92 In addition, the Court seemed willing to apply its func-
tional analysis to all federal executives, even to the President. Indeed,
some commentators interpreted Butz v. Economou 93 as a graceful attempt
by the Court to extract itself from its extension of absolute immunity to
federal executive officers. 94 This interpretation seemed particularly per-
suasive in light of the Court's decision to grant qualified immunity to
governors in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 95 Moreover, Harlow v. Fitzgerald's96 elimi-
nation of the subjective element in the qualified-immunity test indicated
that the Court was still attempting to balance an official's need for se-
curity with an individual's right to remedy.97
Neither the plurality's nor Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald adequately addressed the factors that justify different stan-
dards of immunity for governors and Presidents. 98 Justice Powell
merely argued that the President's "unique" office entails more responsi-
bility and a greater degree of discretion.99 Despite the arguable validity
of this distinction, absolute immunity does not logically follow, for the
President's role in domestic affairs still mirrors, to a large extent, that of
a governor. Certainly in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, which involved a personnel
dispute, the "uniqueness" distinction rings hollow. Although the Presi-
invoked to promote, [and] of confounding the permanent executive office
with its temporary occupant. The tendency is strong to emphasize transient
results upon policies. . . and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the
balanced power structure of our Republic.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Nixon was perhaps the worst possible emissary of the position that he espoused in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald. Given his activities that ultimately led to his resignation, an extra check on his
behavior was probably needed. Certainly he was not deterred by the traditional checks of the
press or Congress. Indeed, transcripts from Nixon's tapes reveal the President's disdain for
Congress. For example, when Secretary of the Navy Seamans was to testify before Congress
on the Fitzgerald affair, Nixon instructed his staff to "have the most godawful gobbledygook
answer prepared. Just put it out on executive privilege. Something that will allow us to do
everything we want." Brief for Respondent at 10, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
Because the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald announced a doctrine that will stand for all Presi-
dents, however, one must examine the decision broadly in terms of constitutional theory,
former cases, and public policy, with an eye toward its effect on the functioning of future
Presidents.
91 161 U.S. 483 (1896); see supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
92 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
93 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
94 Se, e.g., Note, Qualied Immunity, supra note 6, at 590.
95 416 U.S. 232 (1974); see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
96 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
97 As the Chief Justice explained: "Constitutional adjudication often bears unpalatable
fruit. But the needs of a system of government sometimes must outweigh the right of individ-
uals to collect damages." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2706 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
98 But see Note, Presidential Immunity, supra note 6, at 894-95 (different treatment of gover-
nor and President justified by differing constitutional principles that govern their relation-
ships with the federal courts).
99 See 102 S. Ct. at 2702-03.
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dent engages in certain functions that deserve more protection, the func-
tional approach is capable of adjusting for any significant discrepancy.
For instance, when the President directs sensitive issues of national se-
curity, the functional approach allows for the absolute immunity that
the President requires in this area.'00 Justice Powell's emphasis on the
special nature of the President's role seemed more a pronouncement of
his conclusion than a true basis for different treatment.' 0 '
In considering the analogy of cabinet members, the decision in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald seems equally misguided and even more unfair. 0 2
Presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield received
only qualified immunity for the very same activity in which Nixon alleg-
edly engaged. 0 3 Certain highly placed aides and cabinet members regu-
larly confront difficult, discretionary decisions similar to those that the
President himself faces. °4 Although these officials are not subject to im-
peachment, they also have external checks on their behavior; aides and
cabinet members, like the President, are still mindful of Congress, the
press, and their political fortunes. Nevertheless, aside from reiterating
its claim of presidential "uniqueness," the plurality did not explain the
different treatment. In Harlow, the Court declared that qualified immu-
nity represents the "best attainable accommodation of competing val-
ues."' 0 5 In light of this strong endorsement, the Court in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald should have presented a more comprehensive explanation of
why the policy considerations differ for the President.
B. Separation of Powers
The dissent overreacted in claiming that the plurality's separation-
of-powers position would exempt the President from the rule of law en-
100 Se infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
101 Justice White criticized the plurality and the concurrence:
First, the majority informs us that the President occupies a "unique position
in the constitutional scheme," including responsibilities for the administration
ofjustice, foreign affairs, and management of the Executive Branch. True as
this may be, it says nothing about why a "unique" rule of immunity should
apply to the President. The President's unique role may indeed encompass
functions for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It does not
follow from that, however, that he is entitled to absolute immunity either in
general or in this case in particular.
102 S. Ct. at 2725 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
102 But see Note, Presidnt/a/Immuniy,supra note 6, at 895-96 (different treatment of Presi-
dent and cabinet officials justified by constitutional distinctions; Constitution vests executive
power in President and holds only the President, unlike other federal officials, "equal to the
two other branches").
103 &ee Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982);supra notes 46-50 and accompanying
text.
104 For this reason Chief Justice Burger argued in Harlow that Presidential aides should
receive absolute immunity under a theory of derivative immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102
S. Ct. 2727, 2742-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 46.
105 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2737.
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tirely.106 The plurality obviously did not intend to suggest that the
President should be immune from all judicial inquiry. Justice Powell,
however, did not offer a constitutional argument to distinguish between
the President's involvement as a defendant in a civil suit and his subjec-
tion to a criminal prosecution. Furthermore, Justice Powell undermined
his own contention by cautioning that the decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
did not necessarily extend to any future law that Congress might pass to
limit presidential immunity.10 7 Although this type of judicial restraint
buttresses Justice Powell's assertion that he considered policy issues only
to fill a congressional void,108 it nonetheless debilitates the force of his
argument. As a result, it is unclear whether the plurality merely under-
played the implications of its dictum in the name of judicial restraint or
whether in fact, Justice Powell was uncertain of his constitutional
analysis.
In addition, the separation-of-powers argument in Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald encompasses all three branches of government. In effect, the plural-
ity held that under the separation-of-powers doctrine the judiciary
cannot interfere with the executive's attempt to interfere with the Con-
gress. By bestowing absolute immunity upon the President, the Court
thus eliminated a potentially powerful check on his interference with
congressional committees.109 Because the decision hampers congres-
sional control over a recalcitrant executive, by invoking the doctrine of
separation of powers one can defeat absolute immunity as easily as one
can defend it.110
C. The Policy of Granting Absolute Immunity
In the final analysis, the dispute among the Justices degenerated
106 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 65; Immunity, supra note 6, at 231.
108 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2701 n.27.
109 Expressing their concern over potential presidential interference with congressional
committees, Senator Orrin G. Hatch and Representatives John D. Angell, Robert K.
Dorman, Barney Frank, Albert Gore, Jr., A. Toby Moffett, and Patricia Schroeder filed an
amicus brief for Respondent Fitzgerald. Amicus Curie Brief for Respondent, Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
110 Justice White argued that:
Insofar as these statutes implicate a separation of powers argument, I would
think it to be just the opposite of that suggested by petitioner and accepted by
the majority. In enacting these statutes, Congress sought to preserve its own
constitutionally mandated functions in the face of a recalcitrant Executive.
Thus, the separation of powers problem addressed by these statutes was first
of all presidential behavior that intruded upon, or burdened, Congress' per-
formance of its own constitutional responsibilities. It is no response to this to
say that such a cause of action would disrupt the President in the furtherance
of his responsibilities. That approach ignores the separation of powers prob-
lem that lies behind the congressional action; it assumes that presidential
functions are to be valued over congressional functions.
102 S. Ct. at 2720-21 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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into a policy debate."' Justice Powell rested his policy decisions on two
unproved and perhaps unwarranted assumptions. First, he assumed
that without absolute liability, the President would be inundated with
damage claims. 1 2 Second, Justice Powell thought that fear of liability
paralyzed the chief executive, 1 3 diverting his time and energy from the
demands of his office.' 14 No evidence exists, however, that the President
would be inundated with claims. As Fitzgerald pointed out in his brief
to the Court, governors and high-ranking federal executive officials have
enjoyed only qualified immunity since Scheuer and Butz, yet they have
not been flooded by nuisance suits."15
Similarly, the plurality's assumption, that without absolute immu-
nity a President would be deterred from taking controversial stands or
distracted from his duties, also fails for lack of evidence and reason. Un-
til Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the question of presidential immunity itself had
remained unsettled. Indeed, the Court's earlier summary affirmance of
Hapen'n . Kissinger 16 indicated that the President would only receive
qualified immunity. Nonetheless, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan
seemed neither preoccupied by the threat of civil suit nor unwilling to
take unpopular stands. No evidence suggests that they misallocated pre-
cious time to forestall civil suits." 7
Of all the possible candidates for absolute immunity, the President,
who must confront issues with global ramifications, seems the least likely
to be swayed by the possibility of civil suit. With threats of nuclear war,
economic disaster, and social unrest to occupy the President, the specter
of civil litigation seems tame by comparison. Moreover, the assumption
that qualified immunity would deter an honest and well-meaning Presi-
dent from making controversial policy decisions seems no more probable
than its converse-that absolute immunity would provide a malicious
President with a carte blanche to engage in constitutional violations.118
11 In criticizing the five Justices who voted for absolute immunity, Justice White wrote:
"This is policy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy." Id. at 2712 (White, J., dissenting).
112 Se id. at 2703.
113 See id. (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
114 Se id.
1'5 See Brief for Respondent at 26-27, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
116 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976),affdinpartpercuriam, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). In Kissinger, the Supreme Court affirmed four-to-four
(Justice Rehnquist did not participate) the decision of the district court that President Nixon
was not absolutely immune from civil liability for damages arising from violations of the
plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. The Court did not issue an opinion, however, and the
decision was not particularly significant.
117 See Brief for Respondent at 26, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
118 Justice Powell's choice to quote only part of Learned Hand's famous warning in Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), served as
partial evidence that the plurality did not seem to take the risk of malicious, unscrupulous
behavior very seriously:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a
trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all
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As the Court noted in Butz: "[T]he greater power of [high ranking] offi-
cials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct."1 9 Cer-
tainly the wisdom of promoting a "fearless" executive seems inconsistent
with the constitutional notion of limited power through checks and
balances.120
In the end, one senses that the plurality's argument that liability
would paralyze the President masks a more fundamental fear for the
stature and reputation of the Presidency, although one might argue
that damages are more intrusive than injunctive action because they
appear more personally demeaning. 121 This emphasis on the President's
reputation, however, is flawed in two respects. First, the President may
suffer greater injury if he appears to receive special justice. Second, the
President's accountability for other judicial remedies, such as subpoena,
are no less embarrassing or damaging to his stature.122 These forms of
judicial "interference" not only weaken the plurality's separation-of-
powers argument, but also raise interesting policy questions.
Nixon contended that anything short of absolute immunity from
civil liability constituted an intrusion upon the functioning of the Presi-
dent and the stature of his office.' 23 One must question, however, how
much more intrusive civil liability would be than subjecting the Presi-
dent to a subpoena duces tecum,124 as the Court did in Nixon v. Administra-
tor of General Services.125 There, the Court compelled former President
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.
Id. (emphasis added to words deleted from Powell's opinion, 102 S. Ct. at 2703 n.32). Despite
the plurality's lack of concern, one potential outgrowth of affording absolute immunity to the
President, but not to his aides, might be an increase in questionable behavior by the President
himself. The holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald would impede the ability of the President to dele-
gate even the most trivial authority and responsibility. A system in which aides could be
brought into the courtroom while their superior remained totally immune could promote a
President's tendency to hoard authority and responsibility.
119 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427 (1976) (abso-
lute immunity for prosecutors promotes the "vigorous and fearless" performance of their
duty); Immunity, supra note 6, at 230.
120 Note, Scheuer v. Rhodes: A Restatement ofAbsolute Immunity, 60 IowA L. REV. 191, 202
(1974); see also Becht, The Absolute Pivilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REV.
1127, 1166-67 (1962) (noting that the argument for executive immunity has derived support
from the concept of the "fearless official," but suggesting that the contention is unpersuasive).
121 The author wishes to thank Professor Jeremy Rabkin of the Cornell University Gov-
ernment Department for his kind help and provocative criticism in raising the question of
reputation.
122 The plurality failed to demonstrate why civil liability constituted impermissible judi-
cial intrusion on the executive, while other forms of judicial processes did not. See supra note
88 and accompanying text.
123 See Brief for Petitioner at 28-41, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
124 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (neither the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, nor the President's need for confidentiality, without more, sustains immunity
from a subpoena duces tecaun).
125 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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Nixon to turn over the tapes that he had made of conversations in the
Oval Office. This order did more damage to the dignity of the Presi-
dency than Fitzgerald's suit could have ever done. Furthermore, despite
the potential pecuniary loss from Fitzgerald's suit, Nixon probably spent
more time worrying about the tapes and his prospects for impeachment.
Nixon's experience with the tapes demonstrates that civil liability
may be less intrusive than other judicial processes facing the President.
Because the President often must confront judicial intervention and con-
sequent diversion from his duties, the plurality in Nion v. Fitzgerald
should have explained why it singled out civil liability for different
treatment. This need was particularly compelling because civil dam-
ages represented Fitzgerald's only remedy. 126
D. Applying a Functional Analysis to Presidential Immunity
Justice Powell's opinion rejected the functional analysis advocated
in Butz 127 and elevated the President to a privileged status of immunity
that is afforded no other official. 128 One must question, however,
whether the difference between absolute and qualified immunity is suffi-
ciently important to the functioning of the Presidency to justify denying
Fitzgerald, and others like him, a personal, pecuniary remedy.
Had the Court pursued a functional approach, it could have devel-
oped a body of exceptions that deserve absolute immunity. 129 Such ex-
126 As Justice Harlan explained in his concurrence in Bivens, where the sovereign itself
remains immune from suit, and injunctive relief is ineffective, the plaintiff's sole remedy is in
individual official liability. Thus, for Fitzgerald, the choice was "damages or nothing." See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,410 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring). But
see Note, Presidential Immunity, supra note 6, at 904 ("Prohibiting damage liability against the
President would not impede the courts' interest in compensating injured parties.. . . [A]n
aggrieved citizen will almost always be able to sue other culpable defendants.").
127 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
128 Although judges, prosecutors, and legislators receive absolute immunity restricted to
their particular functions, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text, Nion v. Fitzgerald
gives the President much wider latitude:
Similarly, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, like the majority, misses the point in his
wholly unconvincing contentions that the Court today does no more than
extend to the President the same sort of immunity that we have recognized
with respect to Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, and legislative
aides. In none of our previous cases have we extended absolute immunity to
all actions "within the scope of the official's constitutional and statutory du-
ties. . . ." Indeed, under the immunity doctrine as it existed prior to today's
decision, each of these officials could have been held liable for the kind of
claim put forward by Fitzgerald-a personnel decision allegedly made for un-
lawful reasons. Although such a decision falls within the scope of an official's
duties, it does not fall within the judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial func-
tions to which absolute immunity attaches. THE CHIEF JUSTICE's failure
to grasp the difference between the functional approach to absolute immunity
that we have previously adopted and the nature of today's decision accounts
for his misunderstanding of this dissent.
102 S. Ct. at 2711 n.2 (footnotes and citations omitted) (White, J., dissenting).
129 Such an approach would comport with the standard of qualified immunity, tempered
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ceptions would naturally include actions affecting national security and
foreign policy. Thus, courts could easily dispose of the types of suits that
Nixon, in his petition for certiorari, warned would be brought as polit-
ical weapons by individuals disgruntled by the President's foreign pol-
icy.130 Personnel decisions, on the other hand, would fall into the body
of functions deserving only qualified immunity. Ironically, Nixon him-
self described the Fitzgerald affair as merely "a trivial matter-indeed,
an internal executive branch personnel dispute. .... ,,131 Although
Nixon cautioned that denial of absolute immunity in this case would
jeopardize the position of the President, 132 the need for protection is less
when dealing with "trivial matters." Moreover, qualified immunity
would not necessarily involve an intrusive inquiry into the defendant's
subjective motives, but rather an inquiry into the objective qualities of
the presidential action itself.133
The functional approach, concededly poses some difficulties in ad-
ministration and in possible hardship on the President. Courts could
with absolute immunity for certain functions, that currently applies to presidential aides. See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
130 Nixon, in his Petition for Certiorari, argued:
What at present is a suit by a civil servant may well become a suit by an
Olympic athlete who claims that the President has intentionally violated his
rights in precluding him, but not others, from traveling to the Soviet Union.
What today is a suit by a White House staff member whose phone has been
tapped to discover the source of leaked information, may become a suit by a
foreign service employee claiming that he was held hostage for an excessive
period while the President delayed remedial action for political purposes or
prolonged his imprisonment by conducting a military action without comply-
ing with the War Powers Act. Once the barrier against suing a President for
damages is removed, no theory of liability remains implausible.
Petition for Certiorari at 11, Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
131 Id. at 10.
132 See id. at 11-12.
133 The plurality contended that:
Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which re-
spondent lost his job, an inquiry into the President's motives could not be
avoided under the kind of "functional" theory asserted both by the respon-
dent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
102 S. Ct. at 2705. Justice White argued that the plurality's emphasis on subjective intent
was flawed:
The majority also seems to believe that by "function" the Court has in the
past referred to "subjective purpose." See ante, at 2706 ("an inquiry into the
President's motives could not be avoided under the . . . 'functional' theory
.... "). I do not read our cases that way. In Slump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
(1978), we held that the factors determining whether a judge's act was a "ju-
dicial action" entitled to absolute immunity "relate to the nature of the act
itself, ie., whether it is a function normally performed by ajudge, and to the
expectations of the parties." Neither of these factors required any analysis of
the purpose the judge may have had in carrying out the particular action.
Similarly in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512-16, when we determined that
certain executive functions were entitled to absolute immunity because they
shared "enough of the characteristics of the judicial process," we looked to
objective qualities and not subjective purpose.
Id. at 2723 n.34 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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have difficulty delineating which presidential functions deserve absolute
immunity; the President may not know until trial whether a certain
function would receive absolute or only qualified immunity.13 4 In addi-
tion, he might need to expend significant amounts of time and money in
defending unfounded accusations.t3 5 These problems, however, do not
outweigh the advantages of applying a functional analysis, particularly
in light of the alternatives available to reduce interference with the Pres-
idency. For instance, the Court could hold the President absolutely im-
mune from suit until the completion of his tenure in office.' 3 6 Although
this solution does not address the problem of deterring certain discre-
tionary behavior, it does spare the President's valuable time and energy
while in office. Alternatively, the Court could shift the burden of proof
to the plaintiff. Currently the burden "rests on the official asserting the
claim"'1 7 to show the need for absolute immunity. If the plaintiff were
to bear the burden of proving that the President should not receive ab-
solute immunity for a particular function of his office, then courts could
easily identify and dismiss undeserving claims.
Despite the advantages of the functional approach, and barring
some sudden and unforeseen reversal by the Court, the President is now
entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for all actions within
the scope of his office. The aggrieved plaintiff may still argue that the
President acted outside the scope of his authority. 138 Yet, because the
134 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 527 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135 Chief Justice Burger contended:
This very case graphically illustrates the point. When litigation processes are
not tightly-controlled--and often they are not--they can be and are used as
mechanisms of extortion. Ultimate vindication on the merits does not repair
the damage.
102 S. Ct. at 2709 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). In his brief to the Court,
Nixon argued:
Recent decisions have lowered other obstacles to litigation. As this case
illustrates, it is now easy for any reasonably-imaginative counsel to plead an
implied right of action, based on a federal statute or Constitutional provision,
that will survive a motion to dismiss.
Brief for Petitioner at 33, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (citations omitted).
The possibility that the President might be confronted with groundless harassment suits,
however, is still more desirable than the alternative of absolute immunity. Furthermore, one
might question just how often these suits would arise, and how serious a problem they would
pose for a President who did not engage in "dirty tricks."
136 Fitzgerald emphasized that because Nixon was no longer in office when the suit was
brought, many of the policy reasons against suing an incumbent should not apply. In re-
sponse to the argument that Presidents could be sued after leaving office, Nixon asserted:
Moreover, even if suits could be postponed until after Presidents have left
office, an .aternative that would prejudice them, immunity would still be jus-
tified as a means of assuring that Presidents will not function under a constant
threat, resulting from both the costs of litigation and the possibility of ulti-
mate liability, aimed at their personal estates.
Brief for Petitioner at 29, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
137 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982).
138 Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, admitted that:
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Court cited with approval the deferential test of Spalding v. Vilas,139 one
has difficulty imagining many of the President's activities that the Court
would deem outside the scope of his office. 140
CONCLUSION
In Nion v. Fitzgerald, the Court balanced the importance of freeing
the President from the threat of civil liability against the principle of
providing aggrieved plaintiffs the right to redress. In so doing, the
Court accorded undue deference to the unique nature and function of
the Presidency. Rather than abandon the functional approach advo-
cated in Butz, the Court should have granted the President qualified
immunity from civil suits, while providing absolute immunity only for
certain highly sensitive functions. The President should be held liable
for monetary damages when he knowingly violates a plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights. Far from infringing upon the doctrine of separation of
powers, judicial enforcement of the plaintiffs constitutional rights-es-
This is not to say that, in a given case, it would not be appropriate to raise the
question whether an official-even, a President-had acted within the scope of
the official's constitutional and statutory duties. The doctrine of absolute im-
munity does not extend beyond such actions.
102 S. Ct. at 2708 n.4. (Burger, CJ., concurring). The plurality, however, dispelled any
question of how broadly it would interpret the "scope of authority" limitation:
Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues,
no federal official could, within the outer perimeter of his duties of office,
cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed
statutory proceedings.
This construction would subject the President to trial on virtually every
allegation that an action was unlawful, or was taken for a forbidden purpose.
Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute immunity of its
intended effect. It clearly is within the President's constitutional and statu-
tory authority to prescribe the manner in which the Secretary will conduct
the business of the Air Force. . . . Because this mandate of office must in-
clude the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, we
conclude that petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer pe-
rimeter of his authority.
102 S. Ct. at 2705; see also Brief for Petitioner at 48, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690
(1982) ("These standards [of the scope of the President's duty] are formulated broadly in
order to assure that the determination of whether a claim falls within the scope of an official's
immunity does not collapse into the merits of the claim against him.'); Immunity, supra note 6,
at 228 n.18.
139 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896));
see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
140 Should the Court ever wish to overturn this case sub silentio, it could read the test so
narrowly that the issue of the scope of authority would collapse into the merits of the claim.
For example, the Court could hold that because the claim involves a constitutional violation
and constitutional violations are not within the scope of a President's authority, he cannot be
immune.
Butz could be read this way if pushed to its logical extreme. Moreover, even though such
reasoning seems strained and artificial, the Court entertained a similar interpretation in Ex
Parle Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908) (even though sovereign is immune, official must be
"stripped of his official or representative character and. . . subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct").
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pecially when the right to give unfettered congressional testimony is
concerned-would reinforce the strength of our constitutional system.
Aviva A. Orenstein
